Stochastic and Boltzmann-like models for behavioral changes, and their
  relation to game theory by Helbing, Dirk
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/9
80
52
93
v1
  [
co
nd
-m
at.
sta
t-m
ec
h]
  2
2 M
ay
 19
98
Stochastic and Boltzmann-like models for
behavioral changes, and their relation to game theory
Dirk Helbing
II. Institute for Theoretical Physics
University of Stuttgart, Germany
Abstract
In the last decade, stochastic models have shown to be very useful for quantita-
tive modelling of social processes. Here, a configurational master equation for the
description of behavioral changes by pair interactions of individuals is developed.
Three kinds of social pair interactions are distinguished: Avoidance processes, com-
promising processes, and imitative processes. Computational results are presented
for a special case of imitative processes: the competition of two equivalent strategies.
They show a phase transition that describes the selforganization of a behavioral con-
vention. This phase transition is further analyzed by examining the equations for
the most probable behavioral distribution, which are Boltzmann-like equations.
Special cases of Boltzmann-like equations do not obey the H-theorem and have
oscillatory or even chaotic solutions. A suitable Taylor approximation leads to the
socalled game dynamical equations (also known as selection-mutation equations in
the theory of evolution).
1 Introduction
It is well-known that Markovian stochastic processes can be described by a master equa-
tion. The master equation has found many applications in thermodynamics [1], chemical
kinetics [2], laser theory [3] and biology [4]. Moreover, in the last decade Weidlich and
Haag have successfully introduced it for the description of social processes [5, 6] like
opinion formation [7], migration [8], agglomeration [9] and settlement processes [10].
Since the master equation is difficult to solve (even numerically) one often examines
the equations for the most probable distribution of states, instead. These equations are
found to be “Boltzmann-like” equations, and have many applications to the kinetics
of gases [11] or chemical reactions [12]. Special cases of Boltzmann-like equations have
also become increasingly important in quantitative social science, namely the logistic
equation for the description of limited growth processes [13, 14] and the socalled gravity
model for intercity migration processes [15]. Recently, Boltzmann-like models have been
suggested for avoidance processes of pedestrians [16, 17], and for attitude formation by
direct pair interactions of individuals occuring in discussions [16, 18]. The models for
attitude formation include cases of oscillatory or even chaotic behavior (see sect. 5.1).
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Such behavior is, for example, known from fashion or economics (economic cycles, stock
market).
In the following, a master equation for behavioral changes by spontaneous transitions
and pair interactions will be developed. It allows the description of the selforganization of
behavioral conventions. Three kinds of social pair interactions are distinguished: Imitative
processes, avoidance processes, and compromising processes. It turns out that for a special
case of imitative processes the game dynamical equations result, which are used for the
description of cooperation and competition processes.
The game dynamical equations are empiricaly validated [19, 20], and have many important
applications in social sciences [21, 22] and economy [23]. They are also a powerful tool in
evolutionary biology [24, 25, 26, 27]. Moreover, the Lotka-Volterra-equations [28, 29]
for the description of predator-prey systems in ecology [30] are mathematically equivalent
to a special class of game dynamical equations [31].
2 The configurational master equation
Suppose we have a system with a large number N ≫ 1 of subsystems (e.g. a gas with N
atoms). These subsystems are distributed over several states x (which e.g. distinguish the
places r and velocities v of the atoms). If the occupation number nx means the number
of subsystems that are in state x, we have the relation∑
x
nx = N . (1)
The vector
n := (. . . , nx, . . .)
tr (2)
consisting of the occupation numbers is called the configuration of the system (since it
contains all information about the distribution of the N subsystems over the states x).
P (n, t) shall denote the probability to find the configuration n at time t. This implies
0 ≤ P (n, t) ≤ 1 and ∑
n
P (n, t) = 1 . (3)
The temporal development of the probability P (n, t) is governed by a master equation
[32]:
d
dt
P (n, t) = inflow into n − outflow from n
=
∑
n′
w(n|n′; t)P (n′, t)−∑
n′
w(n′|n; t)P (n, t) . (4)
w(n′|n; t) are the configurational transition rates of transitions from configuration n to
configuration n′. Often the dynamics of the system is mainly given by spontaneous transi-
tions and direct pair interactions of subsystems. In this case, the configurational transition
rates are of the following form [32]
w(n′|n; t) :=

w1(x
′|x; t)nx if n′ = nx′x
w2(x
′,y′|x,y; t)nxny if n′ = nx′y′xy
0 otherwise.
(5)
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• Spontaneous changes of the state from x to x′ with an individual transition rate
w1(x
′|x; t) correspond to transitions of the configuration from n to
nx′x := (. . . , (nx′ + 1) . . . , (nx − 1), . . .)tr (6)
with a configurational transition rate w(nx′x|n; t) = w1(x′|x; t)nx, which is propor-
tional to the number nx of subsystems that can change the state x.
• Pair interactions leading one subsystem to change the state from x to x′ and an-
other subsystem to change the state from y to y′ correspond to a transition of the
configuration from n to
nx′y′xy := (. . . , (nx′ + 1), . . . , (nx − 1), . . . , (ny′ + 1), . . . , (ny − 1), . . .)tr (7)
with a configurational transition rate w(nx′y′xy|n; t) = w2(x′,y′|x,y; t)nxny, which
is proportional to the number nxny of possible pair interactions between subsystems
that are in state x resp. y (if nx ≫ 1 where P (n, t) is not negligible, see [32]).
The description of social processes often requires generalized configurational transition
rates of the form
w(n′|n; t) :=

w1(x
′|x;n; t)nx if n′ = nx′x
w2(x
′,y′|x,y;n; t)nxny if n′ = nx′y′xy
0 otherwise,
(8)
since individuals may react on the actual (socio)configuration n. The dependence of the
individual transition rates w1 and w2 on n reflects indirect interactions of the individuals.
3 Equations for behavioral changes
For the description of a system of N individuals, the states x ∈ {1, . . . , S} shall represent
the possible behavioral strategies of individuals concerning a certain situation. The pair
interactions
x′, y′ ←− x, y , (9)
during which the strategies are changed from x and y to x′ and y′, can be completely
classified according to the following scheme:
x, x ←− x, x
x, y ←− x, y
}
(0) (10)
x, x ←− x, y (x 6= y)
y, y ←− x, y (x 6= y)
}
(I) (11)
x, y′ ←− x, x (y′ 6= x)
x′, y ←− y, y (x′ 6= y)
x′, y′ ←− x, x (x′ 6= x, y′ 6= x)
 (II) (12)
x, y′ ←− x, y (x 6= y, y′ 6= y, y′ 6= x)
x′, y ←− x, y (x 6= y, x′ 6= x, x′ 6= y)
x′, y′ ←− x, y (x 6= y, x′ 6= x, y′ 6= y, x′ 6= y, y′ 6= x)
 (III) (13)
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y, x ←− x, y (x 6= y)
x′, x ←− x, y (x 6= y, x′ 6= x, x′ 6= y)
y, y′ ←− x, y (x 6= y, y′ 6= y, y′ 6= x)
 (IV) (14)
Obviously, the interpretation of the above kinds k ∈ {0, I, . . . , IV} of pair interactions is
the following:
(0) During interactions of kind (0) both individuals do not change their strategy. These
interactions can be omitted in the following, since they have no contribution to the
change of P (n, t).
(I) The interactions (I) describe imitative processes (processes of persuasion), i.e., the
tendency to take over the strategy of another individual.
(II) The interactions (II) describe avoidance processes, where an individual changes the
strategy when meeting another individual using the same strategy. (Processes of
this kind are known as aversive behavior, defiant behavior or snob effect.)
(III) The interactions (III) represent some kind of compromising processes, where an
individual changes the strategy to a new one (the “compromise”) when meeting an
individual with another strategy. (Such processes are found, if a certain strategy
cannot be maintained when confronted with another strategy.)
(IV) The interactions (IV) describe imitative processes, in which an individual changes
the strategy despite of the fact, that he or she convinces the interaction partner
of his resp. her strategy. Social processes of this kind are very improbable and can
normally be neglected.
The different kinds of pair interactions have been discussed in [16, 18, 33]. In the following,
our considerations are restricted to imitative processes. The corresponding individual
transition rates have, then, the following general form:
w2(x
′, y′|x, y;n; t) = w∗
2
(x|y;n; t)δxx′δxy′(1− δxy)
+ w∗
2
(y|x;n; t)δyy′δyx′(1− δxy) . (15)
w∗
2
(y|x;n; t) is the rate of imitative strategy changes from x to y and shall be specified
now: Let Axx′ be the success of strategy x when confronted with strategy x
′. Then,
E(x;n; t) :=
∑
x′
Axx′
nx′(t)
N
(16)
is the expected success of strategy x in interactions with other strategies. With
w∗
2
(y|x;n; t) :=
exp
[
E(y;n; t)−E(x;n; t)
]
D(y, x; t)
, (17)
imitative strategy changes from x to y will occur the more frequent, the greater the
expected increase
∆yxE := E(y;n; t)− E(x;n; t) (18)
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of success is, and the smaller the incompatibility (“distance”)
D(y, x; t) ≡ D(x, y; t) > 0 (19)
between the strategies x and y is. (17) is a variant of the multinomial logit model [16, 34],
which has shown to be suitable for the description of decision processes. The ansatz
(17) can also be derived by entropy maximization [16] or with the Fechnerian law of
psychophysics [16, 35].
4 Selforganization of behavioral conventions by com-
petition between strategies
As an example for the behavioral equations, we shall consider a case where the individuals
can choose between two equivalent strategies x ∈ {1, 2}, i.e., the payoff matrix A shall be
symmetrical:
A ≡
(
Axx′
)
:=
(
A+B B
B A +B
)
. (20)
For spontaneous strategy changes we shall assume the simplest form of transition rates:
w1(x
′|x;n; t) ≡W . (21)
A situation of the above kind is the avoidance behavior of pedestrians [16, 36]: In pedes-
trian crowds with two opposite directions of movement, the pedestrians have sometimes
to avoid each other in order to exclude a collision. For an avoidance maneuver to be suc-
cessful, both pedestrians concerned have to pass the respective other pedestrian either on
the right hand side (x = 1) or on the left hand side (x = 2). Otherwise, both pedestrians
have to stop. Therefore, both strategies (to pass pedestrians on the right hand side or to
pass them on the left hand side) are equivalent, but the success of a strategy grows with
the number nx of individuals who use the same strategy. In the payoff matrix (20) we
have A > 0, then.
Empirically one finds that the probability P (1) for choosing the right hand side is usually
different from the probability P (2) = 1−P (1) for choosing the left hand side (see fig. 1a).
As a consequence, opposite directions of motion normally use separate lanes (see fig. 1b).
We will now examine, if the behavioral model can explain this break of symmetry. Figure
2 shows some computational results for D(y, x; t) ≡ 2 and A = 1. If
κ := 1− 4W < 0 , (22)
the configurational distribution is unimodal and symmetrical with respect to n1 = N/2 =
n2, i.e., both strategies will be chosen by about one half of the individuals. At the critical
point κ = 0 there appears a phase transition. This is indicated by the broadness of
the probability distribution P (n, t) ≡ P (n1, n2; t) = P (n1, N − n1; t), which is due to
critical fluctuations. For κ > 0 the configurational distribution becomes bimodal in the
course of time, so that one of the two equivalent strategies will very probably be chosen
by a majority of individuals. This can be interpreted as selforganization of a behavioral
convention. Behavioral conventions often obtain a law-like character after some time.
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Figure 1: (a) For pedestrians with an opposite direction of motion it is advantageous, if both
prefer either the right hand side or the left hand side when trying to pass each other. Otherwise,
they would have to stop in order to avoid a collision.
(b) Opposite directions of motion normally use separate lanes. Avoidance maneuvers are indi-
cated by arrows.
5 The most probable strategy distribution
In order to understand the phase transition more explicitly, we shall in the following
consider the equations for the most probable strategy distribution
P (x, t) :=
n̂x(t)
N
(23)
with
P (x, t) ≥ 0 and ∑
x
P (x, t) = 1 , (24)
where n̂(t) denotes the most probable (socio)configuration. These equations are approxi-
mately given by
d
dt
P (x, t) = mx(n̂, t) , (25)
as can be seen by reformulating the master equation (4) in terms of a Langevin equation
[16, 33]. Here,
mx(n̂, t) :=
∑
x′
[
w(x|x′; n̂; t)P (x′, t)− w(x′|x; n̂; t)P (x, t)
]
(26)
are drift coefficients, and
w(x′|x; n̂; t) := w1(x′|x; n̂; t) +
∑
y′
∑
y
w2(x
′, y′|x, y; n̂; t)n̂y (27)
have the meaning of effective transition rates [32]. It turns out that the explicit equations
for the most probable strategy distribution P (x, t) are Boltzmann-like equations:
d
dt
P (x, t) =
∑
x′
[
ŵ1(x|x′; t)P (x′, t)− ŵ1(x′|x; t)P (x, t)
]
(28a)
+
∑
x′
∑
y
∑
y′
ŵ2(x, y
′|x′, y; t)P (x′, t)P (y, t)
− ∑
x′
∑
y
∑
y′
ŵ2(x
′, y′|x, y; t)P (x, t)P (y, t) (28b)
6
Figure 2: Probability distribution P (n, t) ≡ P (n1, N − n1; t) of the (socio)configuration n for
varying values of the control parameter κ. For κ = 0 a phase transition occurs: Whilst for κ < 0
both strategies are used by about one half of the individuals, for κ > 0 very probably one of
the strategies will be prefered after some time. That means, a behavioral convention develops
by social selforganization.
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with
ŵ1(x
′|x; t) := w1(x′|x; n̂; t) , (29)
ŵ2(x
′, y′|x, y; t) := Nw2(x′, y′|x, y; n̂; t) . (30)
Obviously, the terms (28b) are Boltzmann (collision) terms resulting from pair interac-
tions, whereas the terms (28a) are due to spontaneous transitions.
5.1 Oscillatory and chaotic behavior
For w1(x
′|x; n̂; t) ≡ 0, w2(x′, y′|x, y; n̂; t) ≡ w2(x′, y′|x, y), and∑
x′
∑
y′
w2(x, y|x′, y′) =
∑
x′
∑
y′
w2(x
′, y′|x, y) (31)
equation (28) obeys the famous Boltzmann H-theorem [16]
dH
dt
≤ 0 with H(t) :=∑
x
P (x, t) lnP (x, t) . (32)
According to the H-theorem P (x, t) approaches a stationary solution P0(x) in the course
of time. For example, in a dilute gase the velocity distribution approaches a Maxwell
distribution. However, for social processes the relation (31) may be invalid (since there are
no collisional invariants). As a consequence, the corresponding Boltzmann-like equations
can show oscillatory or even chaotic solutions [16, 33] (see figures 3 and 4).
For example, the special Boltzmann equations
d
dt
P (x, t) = νP (x, t)
[
P (x− 1, t)− P (x+ 1, t)
]
with x ≡ x mod S (33)
display nonlinear oscillations (see fig. 3): A linear stability analysis around the stationary
point P 0 := (1/S, . . . , 1/S)
tr shows that the eigenvalues of the corresponding Jacobian
matrix are purely imaginary [16, 18]. Due to the relations
S∑
x=1
P (x, t) = 1 and
S∏
x=1
P (x, t) = const. (34)
the trajectory P (t) ≡ (P (1, t), . . . , P (S, t))tr moves on a (S−2)-dimensional hypersurface.
For S = 3 strategies the shape of the resulting cycles can be calculated explicitly. It is
given by
P (2, t) =
1− P (1, t)
2
±
√√√√[1− P (1, t)
2
]2
− C
P (1, t)
(35)
with
P (3, t) = 1− P (1, t)− P (2, t) and C := P (1, t0)P (2, t0)P (3, t0) . (36)
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Figure 3: Oscillations are one possible effect of imitative processes. For S = 5 different strategies,
the oscillatory changes look quite irregular without a short-term periodicity. The corresponding
phase portrait has the shape of a torus, which indicates a long-term periodicity by the closeness
of the curve.
Boltzmann equations with chaotic solutions are, for example, given by the following
interaction schemes:
4, 9
k1−→ 1, 9 ,
1, 9
k′
1−→ 4, 9 ,
1, 9
k2−→ 2, 9 ,
4, 6
k3−→ 1, 6 ,
1, 1
k4−→ 3, 3 ,
3, 9
k′
4−→ 1, 9 ,
2, 3
k′′
4−→ 1, 3 ,
8, 6
k5−→ 6, 6 ,
6, 7
k′
5−→ 7, 7 ,
7, 8
k′′
5−→ 8, 8 ,
4, 4
k6−→ 4, 5 ,
5, 4
k′
6−→ 4, 4 , (37)
where kl denote the interaction rates ŵ2(x
′, y′|x, y) of the pair interactions
x, y
kl−→ x′, y′ . (38)
Using the abbreviations
α :=
√
k′1k
′
4/(2k4k
′′
4) , β := k
′
1
/k′′
4
, γ := αk6/k
′
6
,
τ(t) := k′
1
P (9, 0)t , a := k1/k
′
1
, b := k2/k
′
1
,
c := αk5/k
′
1
, c′ := αk′
5
/k′
1
, c′′ := αk′′
5
/k′
1
,
d := αk6/k
′
1
, e := k6/k
′
6
, κ := αk3/k
′
1
,
ǫ := 2αk4/k
′
1
, ǫ′ := k′
1
/(k′′
4
α) .
(39)
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and the scaled variables yx(τ) according to
P (x, t) =: yx(τ)P (9, 0) ·

α if x ∈ {1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8}
β if x = 3
γ if x = 5
1 if x = 9 ,
(40)
the corresponding Boltzmann equations are:
d
dτ
y1(τ) = ay4(τ)y9(τ)− (b+ 1)y1(τ)y9(τ) + κy4(τ)y6(τ)
− ǫ
[
[y1(τ)]
2 − y3(τ)y9(τ)
]
+ y2(τ)y3(τ) ,
d
dτ
y2(τ) = by1(τ)y9(τ)− y2(τ)y3(τ) ,
ǫ′
d
dτ
y3(τ) = ǫ
[
[y1(τ)]
2 − y3(τ)y9(τ)
]
,
d
dτ
y4(τ) = −ay4(τ)y9(τ) + y1(τ)y9(τ)− κy4(τ)y6(τ)
− dy4(τ)
[
y4(τ)− y5(τ)
]
,
e
d
dτ
y5(τ) = dy4(τ)
[
y4(τ)− y5(τ)
]
,
d
dτ
y6(τ) = y6(τ)
[
cy8(τ)− c′y7(τ)
]
,
d
dτ
y7(τ) = y7(τ)
[
c′y6(τ)− c′′y8(τ)
]
,
d
dτ
y8(τ) = y8(τ)
[
c′′y7(τ)− cy6(τ)
]
,
d
dτ
y9(τ) = 0 . (41)
For certain sets of parameters these equations have chaotic solutions. Especially, for the
parameters
a := 0 , b := 1.2 ,
c := 0.46 , c′ := 0.46 , c′′ := 0.46 ,
d := 100 , e := 10000 , κ = varying ,
ǫ := 0.01 , ǫ′ := 0.0001
(42)
and the initial conditions
y1(0) := 0.6 , y2(0) := 1.8 ,
y3(0) := 0.36 , y4(0) := 1 ,
y5(0) := 1 , y6(0) := 1.12 ,
y7(0) := 1 + 0.12 sin (2π/3) , y8(0) := 1 + 0.12 sin (4π/3)
(43)
several period doubling sequences are found, if κ ∈ [0.15, 0.55] is varied (see [16] for a more
detailled discussion). Figure 4 shows computational results for κ = 0.32.
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Figure 4: Temporal development, phase portrait, power spectrum f(ω) and greatest Lyapunov
exponents λx(κ) of the scaled variables yx(τ) = µxP (x, νt) for special Boltzmann equations
that produces chaos.
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6 The game dynamical equations
The socalled game dynamical equations, which are used for the description of cooperation
and competition processes, are also a special case of the Boltzmann-like equations. This
is shown in the following: If we again restrict our considerations to imitative processes
(see (15)), the special Boltzmann-like equations
d
dt
P (x, t) =
∑
x′
[
ŵ1(x|x′; t)P (x′, t)− ŵ1(x′|x; t)P (x, t)
]
+ P (x, t)
∑
x′
[
ŵ∗
2
(x|x′; t)− ŵ∗
2
(x′|x; t)
]
P (x′, t) (44)
result with
ŵ∗
2
(x′|x; t) := Nw∗
2
(x′|x; n̂; t) . (45)
Inserting the multinomial logit ansatz (17) and using a suitable Taylor approximation
leads to the game dynamical equations
d
dt
P (x, t) =
∑
x′
[
ŵ1(x|x′; t)P (x′, t)− ŵ1(x′|x; t)P (x, t)
]
(46a)
+ P (x, t)
[
Ê(x, t)− 〈Ê〉
]
, (46b)
where
Ê(x, t) := E(x; n̂; t) =
∑
x′
Axx′
n̂x′(t)
N
(47)
is the expected success of strategy x, and
〈Ê〉 :=∑
x′
Ê(x′, t)P (x′, t) (48)
is the mean expected success. Since (46b) can be understood as effect of a selection (of
strategies with an expected success that exceeds the average 〈Ê〉) and (46a) can be in-
terpreted as effect of spontaneous strategy changes (e.g. due to accidental mutations) the
game dynamical equations are also known as selection mutation equations [31, 37]. The
mutation term can be used for the description of trial and error.
As an example, we shall again examine the case of two equivalent strategies. The game
dynamical equations (46) corresponding to (20), (21) have, then, the explicit form
d
dt
P (x, t) = −2
(
P (x, t)− 1
2
) [
W + AP (x, t)
(
P (x, t)− 1
)]
. (49)
According to (49), P (x) = 1/2 is a stationary solution. This solution is stable for
κ := 1− 4W
A
< 0 , (50)
i.e., if spontaneous strategy changes are dominating and, therefore, prevent a selforgani-
zation process.
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At the critical point κ = 0 there appears a break of symmetry: For κ > 0 the stationary
solution P (x) = 1/2 is unstable, and the game dynamical equations (49) can be rewritten
in the form
d
dt
P (x, t) = −2
(
P (x, t)− 1
2
)(
P (x, t)− 1 +
√
κ
2
)(
P (x, t)− 1−
√
κ
2
)
. (51)
That means, for κ > 0 we have two additional stationary solutions P (x) = (1 +
√
κ)/2
and P (x) = (1−√κ)/2, which are stable. Depending on initial fluctuations, one strategy
will win a majority of 100 · √κ percent. This majority is the greater, the smaller the rate
W of spontaneous strategy changes is.
The game dynamical equations (including generalizations and other derivations) are more
explicitly discussed in [16, 33].
7 Summary and Conclusions
The master equation and Boltzmann-like equations have shown to be suitable for the
quantitative description of behavioral changes and social processes. In the models devel-
oped spontaneous strategy changes and behavioral changes due to pair interactions have
been taken into account. Three kinds of pair interactions have been distinguished: imi-
tative, avoidance and compromising processes. The game dynamical equations result for
a special case of imitative processes. They can be interpreted as equations for the most
probable behavioral distribution and allow the description of social selforganization of
behavioral conventions.
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